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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
PACIFIC COAST TITLE \ 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
a corporation, I 
Plaintiff and Respondent, I 
vs. > Case No. 8719 
HARTFORD ACCIDENT & 
INDEMNITY COMPANY, \ 
a corporation, I 
Defendant and Appellant I 
ANSWER OF PACIFIC COAST TITLE 
INSURANCE COMPANY TO PETITION 
OF HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY 
COMPANY 
The appellant herein, Hartford, has filed a 
Petition for Rehearing. Respondent, Pacific Coast 
Title Insurance Company hereby answers said Peti-
tition and alleges: 
1. There can be no misapprehension of facts 
in this case as the parties stipulated as to 
almost every material fact in this parti-
cular case. 
2. Every item mentioned and argued by Hart-
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ford in its Petition for Rehearing has been 
covered by the briefs of counsel, in the oral 
argument and considered by the court, 
3. The opinion of the Court is consistent with 
the applicable law of contracts. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF ANSWER 
POINT I. 
THERE CAN BE NO MISAPPREHENSION OF 
FACTS IN THIS CASE AS THE PARTIES STIPU-
LATED TO ALMOST EVERY MATERIAL FACT IN 
THIS PARTICULAR CASE. 
Appellant apparently overlooked the Stipula-
tion of Facts in this case (R. 11-13) page 9 to 12 
of the Title Company Brief. The 15 stipulated facts 
form a complete basis for the cause of action as-
serted by the Title Company and sustained by the 
court. The undisputed testimony of Mr. Mark D. 
Eggertsen further established that because work 
had been started on the project and basements dug 
before a single mortgage was recorded,, the bond 
was required to protect the Title Company against 
the potential liens of materialmen. (See pages 12 
and 13 of Title Company brief). 
Hartford implies that the Court has "misunder-
stood or misconceived" some of the facts. It appears 
that Hartford is contesting the semantics of the 
opinion rather than the justice and wisdom thereof. 
By quoting a few minor excerpts from the body of 
2 
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the opinion, Hartford in its Point I has sniped at 
the opinion without covering some basic factors. 
The burden of Hartford's complaint seems to 
be, now that the extensions of time, variations of 
payment procedures and other beneficial rearrange-
ments have been accomplished between Cassady, 
Felt, Prudential and Associated Accountants, such 
are not binding upon Hartford and in effect pro-
tanto varied the basic contract so Hartford could 
slide out from under its surety obligation. (Note: 
No change or aggregate of changes and alterations 
increased the contract price up to 10%). 
Paragraph 6 of the Contract Bond at issue 
reads: 
"6. The prior written approval of SUR-
ETY shall be required with regard to any 
changes or alterations in said contract where 
the cost thereof, added to prior changes or 
alterations, causes the aggregate cost of all 
changes and alterations to exceed 10 per cent 
of the original contract price; but, except as 
to the foregoing, any alterations which may 
be made in the terms of the contract, or in 
the work to be done under it, or the giving by 
the Obligee of any extension of time for the 
performance of the contract, or any other for-
bearance on the part of either the Obligees 
or PRINCIPAL to the other, shall not in any 
way release SURETY or PRINCIPAL of the 
obligations of this instrument, notice of SUR-
ETY of any such alterations, extensions, or 
forbearance being hereby waived." 
3 
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Thus the inevitable re-adjustments, extensions 
of time, changes, alterations, etc. were anticipated. 
Upon such a premise, it was agreed that no notice 
of such alterations need be given to Hartford of the 
changes and extensions such as were contained in 
the February 16, 1951 modification. Therefore, the 
endorsement of that February 16th Supplemental 
Agreement was unnecessary, but nevertheless Hart-
ford did endorse it without any repudiation and the 
trial court found (Finding No. 30): 
"Hartford had full knowledge of the con-
tents and purposes of said Supplemental 
Agreement of February 16, 1951 (PR 8) and 
upon presentation of the Agreement to it, 
Hartford did not repudiate or reject it, but 
affirmatively consented to the amendment of 
certain provisions of the several agreements 
affected by said Supplemental Agreement as 
herein particularly described. No changes or 
alterations in said contract dated July 19, 
1950 between Syndicate and Cassady (PR 2) 
as amended were made whereby the cost of 
the project added to prior changes and alter-
ations, caused the aggregate cost of all chang-
es and alterations to exceed 10% of the ori-
ginal contract price, nor was such a change 
effected by the Supplemental Agreement of 
February 16, 1951 (PR 6) or by any other 
agreement between Syndicate and Cassady. 
There were no changes or alterations in the 
Contract of July 19, 1950 (PR 2) which in 
aggregate exceeded 10% of the original con-
tract price." 
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The court is again referred to the Title Com-
pany's original brief as Respondent for a more com-
plete statement of our position. 
POINT II. 
EVERY ITEM MENTIONED AND ARGUED BY 
HARTFORD IN ITS PETITION FOR REHEARING HAS 
BEEN COVERED BY THE BRIEFS OF COUNSEL, IN 
THE ORAL ARGUMENT AND CONSIDERED BY THE 
COURT. 
POINT III. 
THE OPINION OF THE COURT IS CONSISTENT 
WITH THE APPLICABLE LAW OF CONTRACTS. 
The Stipulation of Facts in this Title Company 
case, coupled with the court's Findings pertinent 
thereto, form a solid groundwork for the Opinion 
of this court. It is to be noted that no direct attack 
is made upon anything done by the Title Company, 
nor is there any claim of any failure of perform-
ance on the part of the Title Company. 
To succeed in overthrowing the Findings and 
Judgment of the trial court and the well-considered 
Opinion of this court, Hartford must rely upon a 
few minor breaches by Felt. Briefs heretofore filed 
have emphasized the sanctity of Findings supported 
by evidence and the policy of sustaining the liability 
of a compensated surety. Let us take a look at Find-
ing No. 39 by the trial court: 
"Felt Syndicate, Inc. did not breach its 
5 
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contractual obligations to Cassady or to Hart-
ford in any substantial manner and any dif-
ferences between them were resolved by ex-
tensions of time granted to Cassady Company, 
Inc., and by the Supplemental Agreement be-
tween the parties entered February 16,1951." 
Early in the court's history its policy as to peti-
tions for rehearing was announced. 
No rehearing will be granted where nothing 
new and important is offered for consideration, 
(emphasis ours) 
Ducheneau v. House 
4 Ut. 483,11 Pac. 618 
Cummings v. Nielson 
42 Ut. 157, 129 Pac. 619 
"To justify a rehearing a strong case 
must be made. The Supreme Court must be 
convinced either that it failed to consider some 
material point in the case, that it erred in its 
conclusions, or that some matter has been 
discovered which was unknown at the time 
of original hearing. In re McKnight, 4 U. 237, 
9 P. 299; Brown v. Pickard, 4 U. 292, 9 P. 
573, 11 P. 512." 
The whole basic concept of the problems in this 
litigation was comprehended by the court and re-
flected in its unanimous opinion. This respondent 
was designated as "title obligee" in the bond for 
the reason that it would not and did not rely upon 
the contractor but insisted upon a bond to protect 
it from loss. Hartford undertook that obligation. 
6 
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A loss ensued and now that compensated surety is 
asking relief from the very obligation which it was 
paid to assume. Again we believe that the court will 
rebuff such a prayer. 
Appellant initially contended that the Title 
Company could not recover under the bond because 
its damages (attorneys fees and costs) were not 
recoverable under the language of the Contract 
Bond. This contention now has been abandoned as 
not one word of criticism of the decision in this 
respect is found in Hartford's petition for rehear-
ing or the accompanying brief. 
Hartford, as appellant, has reverted to one 
theme, the claimed breaches by Felt bar all recovery 
by the Title Company. We again reiterate the posi-
tion argued in our brief on appeal, that such a strict 
and ruthless interpretation of the Contract Bond is 
contrary to well established rules of law and equity. 
It is entirely true, as appellant claims, that it 
argued the "escape" clause and we answered that 
contention in the original briefs in this case. We 
knew that Hartford's only hope for a way out of 
its liability was via that phrase. We also knew and 
recognized that such a narrow, punitive, forfeiture 
clause could not be construed as Hartford desired 
if the normal rules of construction were applied. 
The court did read those briefs and hear the 
arguments of counsel thereon. It therefor ill be-
7 
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comes the appellant to now claim that the court did 
not "consider the principal contention asserted by 
Hartford for reversal of the judgment below." There 
is no duty imposed upon an appellate court to ana-
lyze, disect and repeat every contention of an un-
successful appellant. 
The opinion clearly shows that the court read, 
heard and understood appellants oft repeated plea 
under the escape clause, as the cou^t P.aid: 
"The principal basis of Hartford's at-
tack upon the judgments is that the plaintiffs 
themselves were guilty of breaches of their 
contractual duties, which prevented its prin-
cipal, Cassady, from performing his obliga-
tions. Inasmuch as the trial court found in 
favor of the plaintiffs, they are entitled to 
have us review the evidence and every reason-
able inference fairly to be drawn therefrom 
in the light most favorable to them." 
WHEREFORE, Respondent, Title Company, 
prays that the Petition for Rehearing be denied, and 
that the case be remanded to the trial court upon 
the basis of the opinion as now published by the 
court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HARRY D. PUGSLEY 
PUGSLEY, HAYES & RAMPTON 
Attorneys for Respondent, 
Pacific Coast Title Insurance 
Company 
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